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ACCESS DEFERRED IS ACCESS DENIED
[In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988)]
INTRODUCTION
For there is no one who does anything in secret if he seeks to be known openly.
If thou do these things, show thyself to the world.
-John 7.4
On June 14, 1988, following a covert investigation spanning sev-
eral years, a multitude of federal agents moved in concert at loca-
tions throughout the nation, to issue "ambush" subpoenas to many
of the country's primary defense industry officials and contractors.'
Dozens of subpoenas were issued simultaneously to ensure the gov-
ernment's element of surprise, eliminate possible destruction of evi-
dence, prevent witness collaboration on alibis and explanations and,
presumably, to capture the attention of the public and the press.
2
The latter it unquestionably did.3 Angered for years by stories in-
1. See Rosenbaum, Pentagon Fraud Inquiry: What Is Known to Date, N.Y. Times,
July 7, 1988, at 1, col. 3. See also Satchell, The Enemy Within, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 4, 1988, at 16-21. U.S. Attorney Henry Hudson worked with a team of
eight prosecutors, 78 FBI agents and 15 investigators from the Navel Investigative
Service to coordinate the secret study which resulted in issuance of over 300 subpoe-
nas nationwide. The warrants included government officials and major Defense De-
partment contractors and personnel. For a list of the persons and contractors for
whom warrants were issued see In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside
Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 577-78 (8th Cir.
1988).
2. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area, No. 88-MISC-260, slip op. at 3-4
(E.D. Mo.July 15, 1988) (district court order for seal of affidavits and other materials
in support of search warrants issued for the offices of two McDonnell Douglas
employees).
3. See Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 570 ("The nature and scope of the investiga-
tion and the dramatic manner in which the search warrants were executed attracted
intense public interest and considerable news media attention."). See also Barry,
Payoffs at the Pentagon, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1988, at 20; Bock, Drawing a Flak Attack,
TIME, July 25, 1988, at 58; Defense Fraud Probe, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July
18, 1988 (special section); Dwyer, The Defense Scandal: Why Justice May be Short on Fire-
power, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 3, 1988, at 45; Forbes, Perestroikafor the Pentagon, FORBES, July
25, 1988, at 29; Gee, Scandal at the Pentagon, MACLEANS, July 11, 1988, at 30; Griffiths,
To Cut the Pentagon Corruption, Cut the Bloated Bureaucracy, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 22, 1988, at
38; Keeping the Pentagon Honest, NEW REPUBLIC, July 18, 1988, at 7; Magnuson, The
Pentagon Up For Sale, TIME, June 27, 1988, at 16; Mecham, Nationwide FBI Bribery Probe
Centers on Defense Consultants, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 20, 1988, at 20;
Sandza, Paisley and the Pentagon, NEWSWEEK, July 11, 1988, at 31; and Satchell, The
Enemy Within, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 4, 1988, at 16.
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volving defense spending cost-overruns, waste and fraud, including
the now legendary $350.00 screws, $700.00 toilet seat covers and
$532.74 hammers, the American public was justifiably concerned
with this new and purported sweeping investigation of alleged de-
fense contracting irregularities totalling hundreds of millions of
dollars.4
Despite the intense public interest in this matter of national impor-
tance, 5 information regarding some of the warrants was placed
under court seal by the issuing courts. 6 Explanation and justification
for the seals was characteristically nonspecific. However, national se-
curity, privacy, fair trial and ongoing investigation interests were all
raised by implication.7
Government responses to requests for the warrant information
were also placed under seal. Investigators maintained that contin-
ued secrecy was necessary during the pendency of the investigation.8
Although the investigating authorities9 had spent years researching
and preparing for the simultaneous warrant issuance, they appar-
ently felt an additional period of secrecy would allow them to more
completely wrap up their study and issue any further warrants free of
public scrutiny.' 0
The government asserted that the integrity of the investigation
would be jeopardized by public disclosure of the warrant informa-
tion. It further asserted the efficacy of the investigation superceded
any public interest in the information.II The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit agreed. In In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area
Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,12 idealistic first
4. See Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
See also Mann, U.S. Fraud Probe Rekindles Military Waste Controversy, AvIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., July 4, 1988, at 14; Rosenbaum, supra note 1 (author estimates the total
dollars involved are in the "tens of billions").
5. "[T]he defense contract and procurement scandal in this country represents
a public concern of great immediacy and magnitude." Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at
576.
6. Various officials involved with the investigation briefed congressional com-
mittees at length regarding the investigation. With the exception of affidavits filed by
James B. Lamb, special agent for the FBI, andJoanne T. Burns, these records are not
yet open to the public. The affidavits described the searches intended for the per-
sons and premises of Mark C. Saunders and Joe Bradley. Id.
7. See id. at 575 (court declined to address the confidentiality issues raised by
amicus briefs).
8. Id.
9. The FBI conducted the investigation together with the Naval Investigation
Service. Id. at 570.
10. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area, No. 88-MISC-260, slip op. at
3-4 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 1988).
11. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574.
12. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
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amendment rhetoric to the contrary,1S the court of appeals held in
favor of the government's request for secrecy and upheld a court seal
on the search warrants and supporting affidavits filed in connection
with warrants for two offices at the St. Louis-based McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation. 14
Before affirming the seal, however, the court analyzed the question
of access rights to pre-trial documents.15 In keeping with recent
Supreme Court decisions favoring court access, the court of appeals
held that a first amendment right of access attaches to search war-
rants and supporting documents.16 This issue of first impression17
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is not without contro-
versy and the definitive statement on the pretrial document access
issue.18 Unfortunately, its refusal to give effect to the access right in
the case at hand effectively reduces the "right" to a "privilege"
status.
Absent a clear showing that the seal was the only method to ad-
dress a compelling need for secrecy,' 9 the court's ultimate denial of
13. Before denying access to the requested documents,Judge McMillan stated in
the circuit court's opinion that a first amendment access right does indeed attach to
search warrants and supporting documents. Id. at 573.
14. Id. at 570 (warrants issued and sealed for the offices of Thomas Gunn, Vice-
President of Marketing at McDonnell Douglas, and his secretary, Linda Ogle).
15. Id. at 572-74.
16. Id. at 573 ("We are persuaded that the first amendment right of public access
does extend to the documents filed in support of search warrant applications.").
17. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a first
amendment access right to trials and to pre-trial proceedings, it has not yet decided
the question of whether there exists a constitutional access right to documents. The
Supreme Court has, however, acknowledged a common law right of access to judicial
records, the exercise of which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court judge.
See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Public Access to
Civil Court Records: A Common Law Approach, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1465 (1986).
In a recent case implicating statutory rather than constitutional access guaran-
tees, the Supreme Court refused access to FBI computer "rap sheet" compilations
including both pre-trial and post conviction data. However, Justice Stevens noted
that much of the information would be available directly from the arresting agencies
and courts themselves since "[a]rrests, indictments, convictions, and sentences are
public events that are usually documented in court records." U.S. Dept. ofJustice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, No. 57 U.S.L.W. 4373, 4375 (U.S.
March 22, 1989) (No. 87-1379).
18. In Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate, 403 Mass. 628, 634,
531 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (1988), decided in late 1988, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts declined to find a first amendment access right to search warrant affi-
davits in a criminal case and specifically cited and disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's
declaration to that effect in Search Warrant. Ironically, the Massachusetts court or-
dered the sealed warrants and affidavits released. Id. at 638, 531 N.E.2d at 1267.
19. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledges that the seal is
appropriate only if" 'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to that interest.' " Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574 (quoting In re New York
Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1272 (1988)).
1989]
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public access to the traditionally open records for warrants and sup-
porting pre-trial documents encroaches upon the significant first
amendment interests of the public and of the press. 20 Denial of pub-
lic access to information in a judicial and law enforcement matter of
critical national concern conflicts directly with public policy and con-
stitutional guarantees favoring an informed public.21 Access to the
judicial process is vital to the protection of civil liberties and should
be available to the public unless there is a compelling need for
secrecy. 22
I. HISTORIC ORIGINS OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Access to the American court system by the public and the press is
and has been the norm. 23 The common law tradition of access has
been traced to practices prevalent before the Norman invasion of
Britain.24 At that time, cases were brought before local courts with
"The party seeking closure or sealing must show that such restriction of the first
amendment right of public access is necessitated by a compelling government inter-
est." Id.
20. Id. at 573 ("[Slearch warrant applications and receipts are routinely filed with
the clerk of court without seal. Under the common law, judicial records and docu-
ments have been historically considered to be open to inspection by the public.").
21. Id. at 573 ("[P]ublic access to documents filed in support of search warrants
is important to the public's understanding of the function and operation of the judi-
cial process and the criminal justice system and may operate as a curb on
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct.").
22. The free flow of information is essential .. . to prevent ... excesses of
authority. As the complexities of modern society have increased, so too
have the opportunities for abuse and, as long as mankind remains suscepti-
ble to the corrupting influence of power, so long will freedom of speech be
essential as a vital check against this. The lesson of Watergate is clear.
Freedom of speech and of the press must thus be regarded as one of the
most crucial of human rights: for "the preservation of our liberties, the scu-
tiny of our laws and the maintenance of justice all demand constant vigi-
lance" and only the free flow of information can safeguard this.
Jeffery, Free Speech and Press: An Absolute Right?, 8 HUM. RTs. Q. 197, 205 (1986) (quot-
ing Sir Norman Anderson, Liberty, Law and Justice, THE HAMLYN LECTURES, Thirtieth
Series, London, 1978, at 104).
23. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise II] ("The right to an open trial is a shared right of the accused and the
public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness."). See also Richmond
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1980), quoting E. JENKS, THE
BOOK OF ENGLISH LAw 73-74 (6th ed. 1967) ("[O]ne of the most conspicuous aspects
of English justice, that all judicial trials are to be held in open court, to which the
public have free access .... appears to have been the rule in England from time
immemorial.").
24. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564, citing Pollock, English Law Before the
Norman Conquest, 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 388-89
(1907).
[Vol. 15
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mandatory attendance for all freemen of the region.25 Following the
Norman Conquest, jury trials became prevalent and the requirement
for all to attend was relaxed, but not the public nature of the trials.26
Attendance was an individual choice but was strongly encouraged.
As the manual for one English court in 1313 explained, "justice
should be administered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the
better accomplishing of this ... pray the community by their attend-
ance to lend their aid."27
Open court proceedings continued through the following centu-
ries in Britain and became an integral part of the judicial process in
colonial America.28 The Journals of the First Continental Congress
expound the virtues of an open judicial system indicating that a fair
proceeding occurs "in open Court, before as many of the people as
chuse to attend,"29 a tradition continued by the new Republic.3 0
II. SUPREME COURT DELINEATES ACCESS TO COURTS
The tradition was expressly incorporated in the United States
Constitution in article III and the sixth amendment jury trial guaran-
tees, the latter of which specifically states that a trial must be pub-
lic.3l The Supreme Court has also acknowleged an implicit
guarantee of openness grounded in the first amendment rights of
free speech and press.32 In 1982, the Court stated, "Underlying the
25. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565, citing 1 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 10-12 (1927).
26. See Pollock, supra note 24, at 389.
27. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 268 (quoting EYRE OF KENT, vol. i, p. 2 (S.S.
ed. 1313)) (both cited in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560).
28. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (" [T]hroughout its evolution, the
trial has been open to all who cared to observe.")
[I]n all publick courts ofjustice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person
or persons ... may freely come into, and attend . . . and hear and be pres-
ent, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not
be done in a corner nor in any covert manner.
1677 CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEWJERSEY (reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry, ed. 1959) and quoted in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S.
at 567) (emphasis added).
29. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 107 (1904).
30. In the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for treason, for example, with Chief
Justice Marshall sitting as trial judge, the probable cause hearing was held in the Hall
of Delegates in Virginia, the courtroom being too small to accomodate the mob of
interested citizens. United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. I (No. 14,692) (CC Va. 1807)
(referenced in Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10).
31. Article III states: "The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury .... U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
32. In an interesting twist on the free press-fair trial controversy, where a defend-
ant objected to closure of a suppression hearing, the Supreme Court stated that the
hearing must remain open because "the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the ac-
1989]
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First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common un-
derstanding that 'a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs.' "33
During the last decade, the Supreme Court has issued several
landmark open trial, open records decisions following a somewhat
less than linear or logical progression.34 Taken as a whole, however,
these cases clearly manifest the Supreme Court's acknowledgement
of a common law right of access to both judicial proceedings and
court documents.
A. Gannett
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.35 In
this case, the Supreme Court addressed the concerns of various
judges that open trials and press access were damaging rather than
furthering a defendant's right to a fair trial.36 Although the Court
noted that the sixth amendment right to a public trial did not give a
defendant a right to demand a closed trial, it nonetheless upheld an
order issued three years earlier by Judge DePasquale, the trial court
judge, closing a pretrial proceeding for a controversial murder
case.37
cused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of
the press and the public." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
33. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
34. See Press-Enterprise 1H, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (press and public have right to
attend voir dire); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (first amendment analysis
applied to public right to attend pretrial suppression hearing); Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-13 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I] (seal
and closure only allowable where trial judge articulates reasons in a written record
and only where no less-restrictive means can secure the government interest); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982) (legislation mandating
closure of certain types of trials violated first amendment); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (absent an overriding interest, closure of an
entire criminal trial is impermissible); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393
(1979) (denial of access is temporary because transcript of suppression hearing is
available); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978) (public
has a presumptive right to government records under the first amendment); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) (criminal trials must be public). Cf. Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (no abuse of discretion where newspaper
prohibited from publishing information regarding trial to which it was a party). See
generally Note, The Free Press-Fair Trial Controversy: A New Standard for Closure Motions in
Criminal Proceedings, 38 ARK. L. REV. 403 (1984); Comment, Constitutional Law: Stan-
dards for Public and Press to Attend Pretrial Proceedings, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 675 (1984).
35. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
36. Before Gannett, "judges [had] started closing courtrooms in order to protect
an accused person's right to an 'impartial jury.'" D. SPENCER, LAW FOR THE RE-
PORTER 190 (5th ed. 1980).
37. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 382. Accord Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). See
generally O'Brien, The Trials and Tribulations of Courtroom Secrecy and Judicial Craftsman-
[Vol. 15
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The Court held that "members of the public have no constitu-
tional right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to attend
criminal trials."38 The Court did not decide whether there was a first
amendment access right to criminal trials and stated that even as-
suming such right existed, the fact that a full transcript of the pro-
ceeding was available constituted satisfactory access.39
Although the Court had presumably been deciding only whether
pretrial proceedings were subject to closure, the sweeping and une-
quivocal language was understandably interpreted by lower court
judges to support closure of any number of court proceedings.40
Acting with uncharacteristic swiftness, lower courts closed more than
200 trial court hearings in the year following the Gannett decision.4'
Confusion reigned and at least five of the Supreme Court Justices
made public statements attempting to clarify the Gannett holding.42
B. Richmond Newspapers
In the aftermath of the Gannett decision, an entire criminal trial was
closed by a Virginia trial judge.43 The order for closure was affirmed
by the Virginia Supreme Court. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court was forced to reconsider the impact of the Gannett
decision issued the year before.44 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,45 seven members of the Court voted to reverse the Virginia
Supreme Court which had supported closure of an entire murder
trial following multiple mistrials and considerable publicity of the
case.46 Unfortunately, since the seven Justices holding for reversal
issued six different opinions, Richmond is not the definitive statement
on open trials that many would have liked.47
In addition to the ambiguous result, one important aspect of the
Richmond decision is that all of the reversing Justices based their
opinions on a first amendment access right rather than on common
ship: Reflections on Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 3 COMM. & L. 3, 13 (No. 2 Spring
1981).
38. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391.
39. Id. at 392-93.
40. Id. at 391 ("[M]embers of the public and the press have no Constitutional
right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials.").
41. D. SPENCER, supra note 35, at 193.
42. Id. See also O'Brien, supra note 37, at 13.
43. D. SPENCER, supra note 35, at 193.
44. In deciding Gannett, the Supreme Court had avoided making a statement on
first amendment access rights but had nonetheless based its opinion on the first
rather than the sixth amendment. "This case would have been unnecessary had Gan-
nett ... construed the Sixth Amendment .. " Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581-82 (1980) (White, J., concurring).
45. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
46. Id. at 559-60.
47. See D. SPENCER, supra note 35, at 194.
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law principles.48 In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "We
hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects
of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated.' "49
Although Chief Justice Burger specifically withheld a decision on
whether the open trial mandate applied to civil cases, he noted point-
edly that "historically both civil and criminal trials have been pre-
sumptively open." 50
EachJustice also noted that the access right was not absolute5l and
Richmond now generally stands for the principle that "absent an over-
riding interest articulated in the [court's written] findings, the trial of
a criminal case must be open to the public."5 2
C. Globe Newspaper
The following year, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,53 the
Court provided some guidance as to what might or might not be an
"overriding interest." In Globe, the Globe Newspaper Company
challenged a Massachusetts law which mandated closure of all trials
involving sexual offenses against minors.54 The newspaper sought
access to the trial of a man accused of the forcible rape and the
forced unnatural rape of one seventeen-year-old and two sixteen-
year-old girls.55 Over the objections of the defendant and without
the request or endorsement of the prosecution, the trial court denied
the newspaper's motion for access and cleared the courtroom. 56
The newspaper immediately demanded injunctive relief from the
exclusion order and the following day the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts denied that request. 57 The United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the exclusion order.58 On remand the
Massachusetts court again dismissed the newspaper's appeal stating
the closure furthered unenumerated "genuine State interests" and
resulted in only a "temporary diminution" of public information.59
48. Id.
49. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 681 (1972)).
50. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
51. Id. at 581-82 n.18 ("[O]ur holding today does not mean that the First
Amendment rights of the public and representatives of the press are absolute.").
52. Id. at 581.
53. 457 U.S. 596, 607-10 (1982).
54. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
55. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 598.
56. Id. at 599.
57. Id. at 600.
58. Id. at 601.
59. Id. at 602.
[Vol. 15
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The Globe newspaper again appealed and the United States
Supreme Court finally ruled definitively that the mandatory closing
law was an unconstitutional infringement of the first amendment ac-
cess guarantee. 60
The Court again cautioned that this access right was not absolute
and indicated that protection of a minor could be a compelling inter-
est justifying closure.61 The Court predicated its reversal on the
mandatory nature of the closure rather than the closure itself.62 The
Court stated, "A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary ... "63
D. Press-Enterprise I
In 1984, the Court narrowed trial judges' discretion in making
these case-by-case access decisions when it decided Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court of California64 (Press-Enterprise I). In this case, the
defendant was accused of the rape and murder of a teenager. Voir
dire for the case had been closed and the Press-Enterprise Company,
a newspaper publisher, objected on first amendment grounds, as-
serting that the public had an "absolute right" to attend the trial
which it further maintained included the voir dire proceedings.65
The California Supreme Court denied access to the voir dire pro-
ceedings as well as to the transcript of the same indicating their in-
tent to protect the privacy of the jurors.66
The United States Supreme Court reversed the closure and seal,
noting that the "process ofjury selection is itself a matter of impor-
tance ... to the criminal justice system." 6 7 The Court stressed that
voir dire has historically been open to the public68 and could only be
closed where there is an overriding "substantial probability" that an
open proceeding will produce irreparable harm.69 The Court fur-
ther held that the closure had not been justified by the trial court
60. Id. at 610-11 n.27.
61. Id. at 607 ("We agree ... that the first interest-safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor-is a compelling one.").
62. Id. at 607-08 ("[C]ompelling as that interest is, it does not justify a
mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case
may affect the significance of the interest.").
63. Id. at 608.
64. 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984).
65. Id. at 503.
66. Id at 504.
67. Id. at 505.
68. Id. at 505-08.
69. Id. at 510. The Court also quoted Globe Newspaper stating, "Where ... the
State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensi-
tive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. (emphasis added).
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through articulated findings of requisite specificity, 70 and that con-
sideration of less sweeping alternatives to closure and total suppres-
sion of the transcript was required.71
E. Press-Enterprise II
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided a different case
also titled Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court7 2 (Press-Enterprise II).
Here it overturned a decision of the California Supreme Court which
had allowed for closure of a pre-trial suppression hearing and seal-
ing of the transcript of that hearing.73
This inflammatory case involved the criminal prosecution of a
nurse accused of murdering at least a dozen hospital patients by le-
thal injection.74 The closed preliminary hearing lasted forty-one
days, producing a transcript of more than 4,000 pages. 75 During the
hearing the defense offered no evidence and insisted that the tran-
script be sealed to conceal this fact and to prevent any prejudicial
pretrial publicity.76
The California trial and appellate courts held that there was a rea-
sonable likelihood of substantial prejudice to the defendant should
the transcript be released. 77 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that a first amendment right of access attaches to
preliminary proceedings78 and that the California appellate courts
failed to apply the "substantial probability" test.79 The Press-Enter-
prise H Court specifically rejected as insufficient the lower courts' ap-
plication of a less stringent "reasonable likelihood of substantial
prejudice" test.80
In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court outlined two complemen-
70. Id. at 511.
71. Id. at 512. The judge suggested partial release of the transcript, closed voir
dire for particularly sensitive questions and release of the answers without juror
names as only some of the alternatives that could have been considered preferable to
closure and seal. Id.
72. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
73. Id. at 5-6.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id. at 4-5.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 7 ("[T~he First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the
label we give the event, i.e., 'trial' or otherwise .. ").
79. Id. at 14. The substantial probability test must be applied if the interest as-
serted is the right of the accused to a fair trial. It requires that preliminary hearings
shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a
substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by
publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure
cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights. Id.
80. Id. The California Supreme Court, interpreting its access statute, concluded
[Vol. 15
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tary factors that courts should consider when determining whether a
public-press access right attaches to a criminal justice proceeding.81
The first factor is whether there has been a tradition of access to the
hearing, trial or proceeding. 82 The second factor the trial court
should consider is whether public access plays a "significant positive
role" in the procedure or function in question.83 In weighing these
factors a court considering an access issue should ask the following
questions: Are people used to having access to this type of informa-
tion and have they come to expect it? And does providing access to
this information help assure justice or the appearance of justice?84
The "tradition" analysis is analogous to the public forum analysis
applied in freedom of expression cases.85 In public forum cases, the
issue is usually whether the public and press have a first amendment
right of access to use a public forum for the expression of ideas. No
such right exists for non-public forums.86 Similarly, where a court
process has traditionally been closed to the public, no affirmative
right of access has attached.87 Where an avenue for communication
or judicial proceeding has developed a tradition of ready public ac-
cess, however, that access cannot be denied absent a compelling
counter-interest requiring closure.
The Court in Press-Enterprise II also recommended accommodation
of the "community theraputic value" function served by openness.88
Some crimes arouse understandable "public concern, outrage, and
hostility" and public awareness that law-enforcement and the judici-
ary are addressing the public's concern disperses what could other-
wise be detrimental disillusionment and lack of confidence in the
that "the magistrate shall close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice." Id.
81. Id. at 8. "If the particular proceeding passes these tests of experience and
logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches." Id. at 9.
82. Id. ("[W]e have considered whether the place and process have historically
been open to the press and the public.").
83. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)).
84. In Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), Justice Felix Frankfurter
stated, "Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
85. See Hague v. Committee For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). As
first set forth in Hague the public forum doctrine provides that where a particular area
or vehicle for communication or expression had traditionally been held forth as a
"public forum" for the free expression of ideas, access to that forum could not be
arbitrarily abridged. When initially set forth, the concept applied to streets and parks
but has subsequently been expanded by the courts. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (shopping centers); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976) (military bases); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(transit ads); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prisons).
86. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
87. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 19.
88. Id.
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entire system.8 9 Public trials, therefore serve to reassure the public
that justice is being served and provide a sort of mass catharsis for
public outrage.90
III. JUSTIFIABLE INFORMATION DENIAL STRICTLY LIMITED
The Press-Enterprise II decision establishes precedent that when the
interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the public
shall have access to preliminary hearings unless specific findings are
made demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that
the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that
closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to clo-
sure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.91
Aditionally, American common law and statutes serve to protect the
citizen's right to access to information.92 State courts have also
given force to common law access rights.93
Statutory access guarantees abound. There exist both state94 and
federal95 access statutes which function to guarantee public access to
government-held information. With the passage of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA)96 in 1966, federal access guarantees ac-
quired broad public recognition. Previous legislation, however, had
guaranteed public access to information for decades prior to the en-
actment of FOIA.97
The legislative intent to allow the broadest possible public access
89. Id. at 13. See generally T. REIR, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS (1959) and H.
WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 130-31 (1956) (refered to by the Court in Press-
Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 13).
90. See Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). The Court stated, "When the pub-
lic is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is function-
ing, an outlet is provided .. " Id. at 509.
91. Press-Enterprise H, 478 U.S. at 14.
92. See 2 B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAw: FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION, PRIVACY, OPEN MEETINGS, OTHER ACCESS LAws, Appendix 18, at 1113-17
(Practising Law Institute 1985) [hereinafter 2 INFORMATION LAw] (list of state open
record statutes). See generally May, Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Common Law
Approach, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1465 (1986) (information concerning common law bases
for access to information).
93. See Paul, Ovelmen, Besvnick & Burt, ACCESS, 3 COMM. LAw 1988 73-191,
(P.L.I. 1988) (comprehensive outline of important state-court access cases).
94. Statutes for all states are listed in 2 INFORMATION LAw, supra note 92, at 1148-
99.
95. The principal federal access statute is the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1977 & Supp. 1989). However, numerous other federal statutes con-
tain access to information provisions. See generally 2 INFORMATION LAW, supra note 92,
chs. 17-23.
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et. seq. (1966 and Supp. 1989).
97. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 et. seq. (1946). See
also 1 B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION,
PRIVACY, OPEN MEETINGS, OTHER ACCESS LAws, § 1-1.1 (Practising Law Institute
(Vol. 15
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to "the maximum amount of information" was based on a property
right theory.98 As enunciated in 1946 by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, information is "public property which the general public, rather
than a few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know or have ready
means of knowing with definiteness."99 Congressional intent to
maximize the information flow was reiterated in the 1974 "Sunshine
Act"t00 amendments to FOIA which further expanded public access
to government-held information.
In United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press,lOl the Supreme Court recently construed the FOIA and
stressed that the basic policy behind the statute is to guarantee the
"citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up
to.' "102
A. Informed Citizenry Touchstone of Democracy
In a free and open society, the public has both a right and a need
to know what its government is doing.t03 It follows that the public
has a right and a need to know what their courts are doing, and
why.1o4 As early as 1827 Jeremy Bentham recognized that an active
press is the best tool available for transmitting this information to
the public:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of
1985) [hereinafter 1 INFORMATION LAW] (discussion of the legislative history of the
APA).
98. Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., (D. Mo.), the original sponsor of the
FOIA, attributed this purpose to the APA in 1959. See Hennings, A Legislative Measure
To Augment The Free Flow Of Public Information, 8 Am. U. L. REV. 19, 22 (1959).
99. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946). Id. (quoted in 1 INFORMATION LAW, supra note 97, § 1-1.1 at 5 n.6).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1974). See generally 1 INFORMATION LAW, supra note 97, § 1-
5.2.1.
101. 57 U.S.L.W. 4373, (U.S. March 22, 1989) (No. 87-1379).
102. Id. at 4380. (quoting E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), in turn quoting
COMMAGER, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, p. 7.) (Although the
Court here refused to grant third party access to computerized FBI "rap sheets"
through the FOIA. Their refusal was based on the privacy exception to the FOIA.
See infra notes 143 to 144 and accompanying text.)
103. See 2 L. JOHNSON, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 699 (1966) (quoted in
Zerbinos, The Right to Know: Whose Right and Whose Duty?, 4 CoMM. & L. 33 (1982).
Upon signing the Freedom of Information Act, President Lyndon B. Johnson lauded
the fact that "the United States is an open society in which the people's right to know is
cherished and guarded." Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
104. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock. Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for
the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, DUKE L.J. 641 (1980). "[T]he
courts have made the judgment that the ... right of citizens to observe and discusss
the operations of the judicial system outweigh any countervailing interests of partici-
pants in secrecy." Id. at 693.
1989]
13
Keller: Access Deferred is Access Denied [In re Search Warrant for Secret
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, ap-
peal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the
character of checks would be found to operate rather as cloaks than
checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.105
Throughout history, powerful governments and institutions have
attempted to control the flow of information.106 The foundation of
American law, of democracy in general, is that power must reside
first and foremost in the people. America is no more a government
of agencies, branches and positions than a government of laws. We
are a government of, by and for the people.
Knowledge is power and in a democracy, power is to reside in the
citizenry, the public. Providing for the free flow of information
therefore provides for the locus of power to remain with the in-
formed citizenry. Withholding knowledge from the public runs
counter to the most fundamental values of the American govern-
ment. As Justice Douglas has succinctly stated, "Secrecy in govern-
ment is fundamentally anti-democratic ... "107
B. Only Compelling Interest Jwstifies Secrecy
The public interest in the free flow of information is so substantial
that courts may not restrict access except in extraordinary circum-
stances. "[T]he Court must weigh the effects of the imposition inhib-
iting access [to information] against the social interests served by the
imposition."108 As stated by Justice Brennan, the balance swings in
favor of secrecy only in the presence of a "sufficiently compelling"
government interest.109
The Supreme Court has long supported the public's inherent need
to know what its officials are doing. 1 0 In New York Times Co. v. United
105. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827).
106. "Through much of history a familiar pattern emerges. Those with political or
ecclesiastical power frequently have sought to restrain, shape or combat information
intended for the masses." W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 3 (1978).
107. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas,J.,
concurring).
108. Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS. L. REV. 173, 177 (1979).
109. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
110. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). "[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond the protection of the press and the self-expression of indi-
viduals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw." Id. at 783. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965). In Zemel, a journalist objected on first amendment grounds to the govern-
ment's refusal to issue a passport allowing him to travel to Cuba to research articles
and books. The State Department had issued a ban on travel to the island for safety
reasons. The Supreme Court upheld the refusal and said, "The right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Id. at
17.
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States,"' for example, the Court refused to issue an injunction
against publication of the "Pentagon Papers." The papers involved
information regarding allegations of defense department misconduct
similar to those under investigation in the "Pentagate" cases.' 1 2 The
Supreme Court believed public access to such information should
not be thwarted. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in
the other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon
executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an in-
formed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the
values of democratic government. 113
Lower courts have also granted access to similar information. In
In re National Broadcasting Company, Inc.,114 the court held that the
public and press had a right of access to FBI video tapes made dur-
ing the course of the ABSCAM investigation of congressional cor-
ruption. 115 Post-trial access to videotapes was at issue, the trial itself
was open. 1 6 The United States Circuit Court for the District of Co-
lumbia stated:
[T]his case involves issues of major public importance-a high gov-
ernment official has been charged with . . . betraying the public
trust, and law enforcement agencies have been accused of employ-
ing tactics which subvert the constitutional rights of the citizenry.
Thus, although the public's First Amendment right of access to the
trial itself was fully respected in this case, and although the case
was reported in the press and broadcast media, we believe ...
"there remains a legitmate and important interest in affording
members of the public their own opportunity to see and hear evi-
dence that records the activities of a Member of Congress . . . as
well as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
1 1 7
111. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
112. Id. at 724. New York Times and the Pentagate cases both involved illegal activi-
ties of high-ranking government officials and the question of public and press access
to information. Both also involve the Pentagon and, by implication, matters of na-
tional defense. Id.
"Pentagate" is the media's term for the government's ongoing investigation of
its defense contractors. See The Real Dangers in "Pentagate", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 15, 1988, at 28.
113. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
114. 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115. In re Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d at 612. For a history of the ABSCAM
investigation; see United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 947-49 (2d Cir. 1980).
116. In re Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d at 612. The National Broadcasting Com-
pany had requested the opportunity to view the actual videotapes made by wired
undercover agents of illegal Congressional deals with foreign nationals. The net-
work also requested a copy of the tapes for public broadcast. Id.
117. Id. at 614.
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C. Government Secrecy Historically Counter-Productive
Ironically, attempts to conceal information regarding the actions
of the government have generally diminished rather than protected
national security interests.18 Regretting the successful suppression
of information regarding the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation, for
instance, President Kennedy later told the New York Times, "Maybe
if you had printed more about the operation, you would have saved
us from a colossal mistake."' 19
D. Access and Secrecy Must Be Balanced
The Supreme Court has nonetheless made it clear that common
law and first amendment access rights must be weighed against coun-
tervailing interests such as national security, the right to a fair trial
and, to a lesser degree, privacy interests, trade secret protections,
and the efficacy of ongoing law enforcement efforts.120
1. Fair Trial
The fair trial interests of a defendant are constitutionally protected
and have been termed the preeminent interest to be protected in
court access cases.'21 The free press-fair trial controversy has been
much discussed and essentially states that where dissemination of in-
formation or access to a judicial proceeding will render a fair trial
impossible, that information can be temporarily withheld from the
public since the accused's right to a fair trial must be preserved.122
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that there is a
right of access to trials.123 The standard for access denial is very
high and a substantial probability that a fair trial will be impossible
118. See Note, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 409 (1986). Far from preserving national security, excessive se-
crecy has actually harmed it. The nation's security (and reputation) has been im-
paired by the secret formulation of poorly conceived policies. Had the policymaking
apparatus accomodated more criticism and open debate, it is likely that at least in
some instances, waste and ineptitude could have been discovered, flawed concep-
tions of national objectives might have been corrected, and policies that better en-
hanced national security might have been pursued. Id. at 449.
119. F. FRIENDLY & M. ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 61
(1984) (quoting Kennedy discussion with New York Times Managing Editor Turner
Catledge).
120. See infra notes 121-47 and accompanying text.
121. 1 INFORMATION LAW, supra note 97, § 11-6.
122. See generally D. Paul, R. Ovelmen, L. Besvnick & F. Burt, ACCESS, 3 COMMUNI-
CATIONS LAW 1988 73-191, (P.L.I. 1988); Ponsoldt, Balancing Government Efficiency and
the Protection of Individual Liberties: An Analysis of the Conflict Between Executive Branch
"Housekeeping" Regulations and Criminal Defendants' Rights to a Constitutional Fair Trial, 19
HARV. CIv. LIB. L. REV. 350 (1984).
123. See supra notes 31-117 and accompanying text.
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must exist to justify closing a judicial proceeding.124 Although ac-
cess to pretrial processes is not so clearly delineated, the vast major-
ity of courts which have considered this issue have held that trial
access rights do extend to pretrial proceedings.1
25
Further, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,126 the Supreme
Court expressly acknowledged a presumptive right of access to judi-
cial records.12 7 This right of access carries with it a corollary duty on
the part of the courts not to interfere with access. 128 Better known
as the "Watergate Tapes Case," Nixon addressed media requests to
duplicate the audio tapes introduced during the public Watergate
proceedings.129 Although it ultimately refused media requests to
copy the tapes based on a technicality in federal law,' 3 0 the Court
nontheless found that a common law right of access to judicial
records exists. That right is based on the public's need to monitor
the judiciary and to acquire information regarding government
activity. 13'
124. 1 INFORMATION LAW, supra note 97, at § 11-6.
125. Pre-trial access is a somewhat murky area of law but a vast majority of state
courts which have considered the question have found that trial access rights extend
to pre-trial proceedings. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101
Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152,
662 S.W.2d 174 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So.2d .1 (Fla.
1982); R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 578-79, 292 S.E.2d 815, 819
(1982); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 580 P.2d 49, 56 (1978);
State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P.2d 206 (1957); State ex rel. Post-Tribune Pub-
lishing Co., 274 Ind. 408, 412 N.E.2d 487 (1980); Iowa Freedom of Information
Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury,
612 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Ky. App. 1980); Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Kammeyer, 341
N.W.2d 550 (1983); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 186 Mont. 4233, 608 P.2d
116 (1980); Davis v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 511, 569 P.2d 402 (1977); Keene Publishing
Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, 119 N.H. 710, 406 A.2d 137 (1979); State
v. Williams, 93 NJ. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983); Westchester Rockland Newspapers v.
Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 439, 399 N.E.2d 518, 523 (1979); Minot Daily News v.
Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phil-
'lips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa.
419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah
1984); Herald Ass'n., Inc. v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 534, 419 A.2d 323, 326 (1980);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 281 S.E.2d 915 (1981);
State ex rel Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 165 W. Va. 103, 267 S.E.2d 544 (1980);
Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979).
126. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
127. Id. at 596.
128. See Zerbinos, The Right to Know: Whose Right and Whose Duty?, 4 COMM. & LAw
33 (1982). If the public has a right to court access, "[t]he correlative duty on the part
of the judiciary is not to interfere with that right, except in genuinely extraordinary
circumstances." Id. at 47.
129. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 591.
130. Id. at 603-08 (citing Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974)) (following 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982)).
131. Id. at 597.
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In sum, the fair trial exemption to information access is strictly
limited to exceptional circumstances. It is not a concern for court-
room decorum or prosecutorial convenience which justifies access
denial, but the actual probability of a miscarriage of justice.
2. National Security
Similarly, the constitutional "military and states secret privilege,"
delineated by the Supreme Court in United States q. Reynolds132 is not
unlimited. The military and states secrets privilebe has both consti-
tutional and legislative origins. Under either privilege, sensitive in-
formation relating to military plans, weapons, or operations,
vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, and other specified catago-
ries of information may be closed to the public to protect national
security interests.1 33
As a practical matter, most national security information is classi-
fied and subject to statutory protection.134 Classification of sensitive
information is subject to control of the executive branch based on
the constitutional authority granted to the president as commander-
in-chief.135 The current classification regulation, issued in 1982, re-
quires classification and consequent nondisclosure of certain classes
of material when they may "reasonably be expected to damage" na-
tional security.136 However, in the interest of the fullest possible
public access to sensitive information, the order requires that all in-
formation be declassified or downgraded as soon as security
permits. 137
Nor is the classification system to be used as a shield for questiona-
ble government activity. The order explicitly prohibits withholding
of information to protect the reputation or image of any individuals
or agencies. Information may not be sealed to cover "violations of
law, inefficiency or administrative error" nor to "prevent embarrass-
ment, restrain competition or delay the release of information not
properly classifiable."138 Classified documents are specifically ex-
empt from public access and from forced disclosure through the
machinations of FOIA "exemption I," which allows for exemption by
132. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
133. See generally 2 INFORMATION LAW, supra note 92, at § 5 (FOIA'S mandatory
disclosure requirement does not apply to matters classifed as secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy by an executive order).
134. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982). This section provides that classified
documents are specifically exempt from public access and from forced disclosure
through the Freedom of Information Act "exemption I," which allows for exemption
by valid executive order.
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
136. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
137. Id.
138. Id. See generally 2 INFORMATION LAw, supra note 92, at § 5.
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valid executive order.13 9
3. Trade Secrets
Commercial interests and trade secrets are also protected from ac-
cess demands by exemptions in FOIA and by the Federal Trade
Secrets Act.' 40 In Chrysler Corporation v. Brown, 14 1 the Supreme Court
held that a reverse FOIA suit could be brought to prohibit access to
valid trade secret information. The information must be a genuine
secret, the release of which would cause actual damage to the secret
holder. 142
4. Privacy Interests
Personal privacy interests are also protectable, based in large part
on the Privacy Act of 1974.143 The FOIA also exempts personal in-
formation from public access where there would exist a "clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy."144 Essential considerations
in any privacy disclosure suit include whether the information is of
an intimate nature, whether the person involved had a legitimate ex-
pectation of confidentiality, whether and to what degree that person
will be harmed by disclosure and whether or not there is an overrid-
ing public interest in disclosure of the information.145
5. Law Enforcement
The FOIA also exempts from disclosure certain sensitive informa-
tion regarding names of informants, information endangering the
life or safety of law enforcement personnel or witnesses and specifics
related to an ongoing and legitimate law enforcement proceeding
when the release would irreparably harm the government's case in
court.146 The law enforcement exemption is not intended to prevent
139. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.6(a), Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
140. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982). Compare Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982).
141. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
142. Id. at 292.
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
144. Id. See especially, U.S. Dept. ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, No. 57 U.S.L.W. 4373, 4382 (U.S. March 22, 1989) (No. 87-1379). Here the
Court refused to grant reporters access to individual FBI "rap sheet" compilations of
pre-arrest, arrest, pre-trial and conviction data. The court construed the privacy ex-
emption to the FOIA and held categorically that such third-party requests for law-
enforcement records about private citizens "can reasonably be expected to invade
that citizen's privacy, and that when the request seeks no 'official information' about
a Government agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be stor-
ing, the invasion of privacy is 'unwarranted'." See generally 2 INFORMATION LAW, supra
note 92, at ch. 21.
145. See id.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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the release of information already available to an investigation sub-
ject nor is it intended to protect against adverse publicity. The integ-
rity of the law enforcement effort is the protected interest-not the
information itself. 147
IV. CASE: IN RE SEARCH WARRANT
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in its 1988 decision in
In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn,
McDonnell Douglas Corp.,148 denied the public access to information
regarding a pre-trial judicial proceeding while acknowledging in the
same opinion that the public and press have a first amendment right
to that information.149 At issue was a lower court's seal of the court
docket, search warrant applications and supporting affidavits issued
in conjunction with a nationwide investigation of alleged irregulari-
ties and outright fraud in the nation's defense contracting
industry. 150
Addressing the public's interests in the efficient and appropriate
machinations of the national defense industry, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Naval Investigation Service had, for the past
two years, conducted a comprehensive undercover investigation of
reported irregularities and fraud throughout the defense industry. 151
In June of 1988, the investigation resulted in the simultaneous issu-
ance of more than forty separate search warrants for strategic de-
fense contracting persons and corporations nationwide.152
Although the lengthy investigation culminated in the tactical si-
multaneous issuance of warrants, the investigating agents apparently
believed that continued secrecy concerning contents and subjects of
the warrants would in some way facilitate law enforcement efforts.153
Some of the warrants together with supporting affidavits as court
documents for some of the investigation subjects were sealed by vari-
ous district courts. 154 Among the sealed warrants were those for
147. See id. See generally 1 INFORMATION LAw, supra note 97, at § 11.
148. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
149. Id. at 575. "[W]e hold that the qualified First Amendment right of public
access extends to the documents filed in support of search warrants and the docu-
ments may be sealed if the sealing is necessary to protect a compelling government
interest and that less restrictive alternatives are impracticable." Id.
150. Id. at 571. See also In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area, No. 88-MISC-260,
slip op. at 3,4 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 1988)(district court seal order and extension).
151. See Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 570. The investigation involved Pentagon offi-
cials and consultants and defense contracting companies and their officials. See Ro-
senbaum, Pentagon Fraud Inquiry: What is Known to Date, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1988, at 1,
col. 3, for a list of the companies and people involved.
152. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 570.
153. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
154. Affidavits regarding some of the warrants were not sealed. Search Warrant,
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Thomas Gunn and his secretary, both employees of St. Louis-based
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, one of the nation's largest defense
contractors.' 55 On July 6, 1988, more than three weeks after the
warrants were first issued, and after informal requests for access to
the warrants and supporting materials went unanswered, the St. Louis
Post Dispatch, an editor, and its publisher, filed a motion to unseal the
affidavits. ' 56 The next day, a detailed article outlining the subjects of
the warrants issued and the probable purpose for each, appeared on
the front page of the New York Times, effectively eliminating any previ-
ously legitimate secrecy argument the government may or may not
have had. 157
Nonetheless, the next week, following deliberation on the motion
to unseal and the McDonnell Douglas response (which response was
itself placed under seal) the District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri not only upheld the seals on all the documents and the
court docket, but extended the seal period.158 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit expedited review and heard oral argu-
ment on the appealed seal order later in July.159 It, too, upheld the
seals on the search warrants and supporting affidavits while making
the then inconsequential gesture of ordering the district court
docket unsealed.160 The Eighth Circuit prefaced its denial of public
and press access to the documents with a first-impression opinion
that the first amendment right of public access extends to the docu-
ments filed in support of search warrant applications.161
V. ACCESS DEFERRED IS ACCESS DENIED
The court of appeals' declaration in In re Search Warrant that an
access right exists for pretrial documents deserves commendation.
However, its refusal to unseal the "Pentagate" court records in-
volved, even after the information they contained had been made
public through alternate means, is inexpicable.162 Closure could not
855 F.2d at 577. The seals on others were allowed to expire "due to government
inadvertence." Id. at 575.
155. Id. at 571.
156. Id. (the motion was filed pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. (West, 1988)).
157. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
158. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 571. See also In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area.
No. 88-MISC-260, slip. op. at 3-4 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 1988) (district court seal order
and extension).
159. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 571.
160. The court of appeals noted that sealing the court docket was overzealous and
indicated "an abundance of caution" on the part of the district court. "The case
dockets maintained by the clerk of the district court are public records." Search War-
rant, 855 F.2d at 575 (quoting United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1984)).
161. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 575. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
162. The newspapers of the nations have devoted extensive press coverage to
the investigation.... The government has briefed congressional committees
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have served a compelling government secrecy interest but access
would have met a valid and significant public interest. Closure
serves merely to reinforce the public's disillusion with the defense
industry, the judicial system and their government in toto. In the
words of the United States Supreme Court, "People in an open soci-
ety do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is diffi-
cult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing."163
A. Pre-trial Document Access Issue
Although only dicta, given the resultant ongoing seal, the pretrial
document access declaration is consistent with the Supreme Court's
judicial access rationale. 164 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reasoned that search warrant applications and receipts are rou-
tinely filed openly with the court, that judicial records are historically
open to public inspection and that public access to such documents
serves an important public information function.165 The court fur-
ther acknowledged that, like voir dire, search warrants, while not
part of a trial per se, are an "integral part of a criminal prosecution"
and "are at the center 'of pre-trial suppression hearings."166 This
reasoning was directly in line with both constitutional and common
law access theory.
The court of appeals' decision in In re Search Warrant attempted to
exhibit compliance with each of the Supreme Court's requirements
for permissible access denial laid out in Gannett, Richmond Newspapers,.
Globe Newspaper, Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise J.167 The court
of appeals did not deny access to an entire trial, as is forbidden by
Gannett and Richmond when read together.168 Rather, it denied ac-
cess to certain court documents.169 Regardless of the merits of its
conclusions, the Eighth Circuit did "articulate" its reasons for clos-
on both the scope and the specifics of the investigation ... affidavits have
been released to the public. Indeed a strong argument can be made that all
of those involved with the investigation, as targets or otherwise, know its details, and
only the general public remains in the dark.
Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis
added).
163. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (1980).
164. See supra notes 35-90 and accompanying text.
165. "[S]earch warrant applications and receipts are routinely filed with the clerk
of court without seal." Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 573. "[P]ublic access to docu-
ments filed in support of search warrants is important to the public's understanding
of the function and operation of the judicial process and the criminal justice system
and may operate as a curb on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct." Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 35-90 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
169. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 573.
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ing the records in its opinion, as required by Richmond.170 The Court
of Appeals' closure of the documents was also based upon an in-
dependent request regarding a particular case and was not a blanket
policy decision to close all such records.171 Closure not based on the
facts of a particular case is forbidden by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in ,Globe. 172
B. Seal Not Justified by Compelling Interest in Secrecy
Ultimately, however, the reasoning proved for naught since the
court of appeals held that the government's ongoing investigation
was a compelling enough state interest to justify maintaining the
seals.17 While meaningful discussion of the precise content of the
sealed information is impossible, the court indicated that the sup-
porting affidavits included transcripts of wiretaps, details regarding
the individuals and specific projects involved and reveal "the nature,
scope and direction of the government's ongoing investigation."174
Admittedly these are the types of information which the FOIA law
enforcement exemption from access addresses. It is also likely that
the investigation was "ongoing" and the warrant issuance was not a
final resolution.'75 However, since the information regarding the
warrant recipients and their ties to the scandal had been detailed in
the press, 176 any FOIA exemption rationale would have been
moot. 177
The access denial was predicated on the need for continuing se-
crecy to protect the government's ongoing investigation.178 How-
ever, as Judge Heaney noted in his concurring and dissenting
opinion, details regarding the Pentagon officials, consultants, de-
fense contractors and corporate officials under investigation had al-
ready been front page news in the nation's newspapers.' 79
The need for secrecy, had it ever existed, was long gone. Not only
had the individuals and corporations actually under scrutiny been
alerted to the government investigation by virtue of personal service
of subpoenas,180 the remainder of the defense industry and the pub-
lic at large had been put on notice by the press.' 8 ' Any "destruction
170. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 452.
171. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574:
172. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603-06.
173. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574.
174. Id.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7) (1982).
176. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
177. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id. See also N. Y. Times, July 7, 1988 at 1, col. 1.
180. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
181. Id.
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of documents" or "evidence tampering" the court attempted to pre-
vent through sealing the court records had long since taken place.
C. Less Sweeping Alternative to Seal Rejected
In keeping with the holding in Press-Enterprise I, the court appar-
ently considered "less restrictive alternatives" to sealing the
records. 182 Total denial of access is not permissible if less restrictive
alternatives exist.183 However, the court summarily dismissed the al-
ternatives, such as line-by-line reduction and partial dissemination,
as "impracticable."184 Assuming that the search warrant informa-
tion contained protectable secrets, and apparently it did not, 185 line-
by-line reduction should have been utilized.
It is not enough that this was deemed "impracticable."1 8 6 Admin-
istrative convenience is not the compelling interest mandated by the
Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise I for denial of access to court docu-
ments. For as Chief Justice Burger has said, "All of the alternatives
[to absolute closure or seal] admittedly present difficulties for trial
courts, but none of the factors relied on here [is] beyond the realm
of the manageable."1 87 Judicial protection for bureaucratic or law
enforcement officials should not be allowed to supercede the public's
right to know. The court of appeals should have stepped aside and
awarded access in fact as well as in principle.188
D. Overriding Public Interest in Scandal Investigation
The court further failed to adequately address the factors set forth
by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II. 189 Under that test, the
seal of the search warrant and affidavit would almost certainly have
been denied. The first factor of the test asks whether access has been
traditionally available.' 90 Here, as the court of appeals correctly
noted, the answer is clear: search warrants, affidavits, and, most as-
182. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574. Press-Enterprise I addressed the issue of a
California trial court judge's failure to consider alternatives to closure of a publicized
rape trial. Press Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 513.
183. See Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 574.
184. Id.
185. Id. The government's argument for closure was that its ongoing investiga-
tion would be jeopardized by disclosure, not that protectable secrets were contained
in the warrants. Id.
186. Id.
187. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
188. This American government,-what is it but a tradition, though a recent
one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant
losing some of its integrity?... [TIhis government never of itself furthered any enter-
prise, except by the alacrity with which it got out of its way.
H. THOREAU, ON THE DUTrv OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 1 (1844) (emphasis added).
189. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 8.
190. Id.
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suredly, court dockets have traditionally been maintained without
seal.. 19
The second factor of the Press-Enterprise II test asks whether afford-
ing access will serve a "community therapy" function.192 The court
of appeals failed to address this public interest function. Public in-
dignance is justifiably roused by the seemingly endless allegations of
senseless cost-overruns and outright fraud levelled against the na-
tion's defense industry.193 It is difficult to imagine a public policy
issue with more direct impact on our democratic society, its citizens,
or its future than nationwide fraud in our government defense con-
tracting industry.194 The existence of waste and duplication as well
as the possibility of wide-spread fraud on the part of the Department
of Defense, the various branches of the armed forces and the defense
contracting industry as a whole gives rise to fundamental questions
facing a concerned public.195
Questions raised by the spectre of Pentagate include: Are our
elected officials and their appointees behaving as we want them to?
Is our government as a whole doing what we want it to do? Is it
doing what the law says it must do? Are our law enforcement agents
acting to uphold the law? Are our tax dollars being spent wisely? Is
our national defense secure? What are the courts doing about it?
These are question which the public properly asks and to which they
deserve an answer.
The drafters of the Constitution intended that issues relating to
taxes, national defense, government fraud, law enforcement, the
machinations of the judiciary should be openly discussed.196 These
are precisely the sorts of issues upon which public debate is man-
datedI 97 and to which the first amendment has particular rele-
vance. 198 The public is clearly interested in and outraged by the
191. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
193. See also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
194. Search Warrant, 855 F.2d at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
195. Id. at 576. "The First Amendment... [has] a common core purpose of as-
suring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of govern-
ment." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
196. James Madison, author of the first amendment stated: "A popular govern-
ment, without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce
or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a peo-
ple who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowl-
edge gives." J. MADISON, THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (S. Padover, ed. 1953)
(emphasis added).
197. As the Supreme Court indicated in Globe Newspapers, access is protected "to
ensure that this constitutionally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an
informed one." Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 604-05 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
198. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
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allegations arising from the Pentagate investigation.199 Full knowl-
edge regarding the investigation would most assuredly serve to reas-
sure a disenchanted electorate that their law enforcement and
judicial officials are acting within the scope of the law, even if Penta-
gon officials are not.
Balancing the government's security needs against the public's
need to know is vital.200 Blanket or automatic government authori-
zation to withhold information regarding issues important to an in-
formed citizenry undermines the strength of the republic. This
danger is particularly serious where the government "secret" in-
volves the ineptitude or outright illegality of government actions.201
CONCLUSION
In In re Search Warrant, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
significantly encroached upon the right of the public and the press to
access information regarding the working of their government. 20 2
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free speech-press
clause was intended to "prevent the government from interferring with the commu-
nication of facts and views about governmental affairs, in order that all could prop-
erly exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a free society. This clause
was intended as one of the guarantees of the people's right to know." Parks, The Open Govern-
ment Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
3 (1957) (emphasis in original).
199. "Knowledgeable United States Senators have reported that the amount of
public funds involved reaches the hundreds of millions of dollars." Search Warrant,
855 F.2d at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting). "[T]he defense contract
and procurement scandal in this country represents a public concern of great imme-
diacy and magnitude." Id.
200. By not weighing the value to the public of knowing about particularly
relevant episodes in the [nation's] intelligence agencies' history, we may un-
dermine the public's ability to assess the government's performance of it's
duty.., with no mechanism in the system for balancing the public's right to
know with possible risks to security, [denial of access] can also result in the
permanent loss of information critical to public debate.
McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, C.J., separate
statement).
201. Refusing to seal divorce court documents involving alleged misconduct of a
local official, a court held that the public has a "vital interest in acquiring information
about official wrongdoing." George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Public Register of
Probate, 11 MEDIA L. REP. 2331 (Mass Sup. Jud. Ct. 1985). See generally Comment, A
Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409
(1986).
202. When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else- who must pass judgment
upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas
must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as
well as safe .... Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an
issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or dis-
belief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result much
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good... The principle
offreedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.
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While the court is to be applauded for its conclusion that the first
amendment entitles the press and the public to search warrant filing
information, its refusal to grant that same access in In re Search War-
rant is ominous. Both the public and the press have reason to be
wary of this gratuitous grant of power to law enforcement agencies
and enshrouding of the judicial process.
Julie Esther Keller
Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, POLrTCAL AND CIIL RIGTrrs IN THE UNITED STATES, Vol.
1, at 9 (Dorsen, Bender and Neuborne, eds., 4th ed. 1976) (emphasis added).
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